In this paper, the results show that the introduction of those two inputs is not optimal. The suggestion on improving the resistance against GD attack for SNOW2.0 is given.
Introduction
The original version denoted SNOW1.0 [1] was submitted to the NESSIE project. It has excellent performance, several faster than AES. However, a few attacks have been reported. SNOW2.0 was proposed by Ekdahl and Johansson in [2] as a strengthened version of SNOW1.0. Currently, SNOW2.0 is considered as one of the most efficient stream ciphers. It is used for benchmarking the performance of stream ciphers by the eSTREAM project. SNOW2.0 has also been taken as a starting point for the ETSI project on a design of a new UMTS encryption algorithm [3] . Because of efficient implementation both in hardware and software, SNOW 2.0 is one out of two stream ciphers chosen for the forthcoming international standard ISO/IEC IS 18033-4 [3] .
Guess and Determine (GD) attack can be considered as one of the general attacks on stream ciphers. Arising from the name, in GD attacks, the contents of some cells are to be guessed, based on which the contents of the other cells of the stream cipher can be determined. In [4] a systematic way of implementing some GD attacks by solving systems of linear equations, called Advanced GD attacks, is introduced. The result of implementing Advanced GD attacks on SNOW 2.0 shows the complexity of , while there is no heuristic GD attack introduced on SNOW 2.0. In [5] , it has been shown that there is a linear distinguisher on SNOW 2.0 which requires bits of keystream and operations. In 2008, Jung-Keun Lee et al. [6] presented a correlation attack on SNOW2.0 with a computational complexity of , a Memory complexity of bits, a data complexity of bits. 
O
The main changes from SNOW 1.0 to SNOW 2.0 were to modify the feedback polynomial and to ensure that the FSM takes two inputs from the shift register. The introduction of two inputs to the FSM part makes a guess-and-determine attack more difficult. But the designers of SNOW2.0 did not show the method of introducing these two inputs in [2] . In this paper, we will show the optimal inputs introduced to the FSM part to improve the resistance against GD attacks.
In section 2 a short description of SNOW 2.0 is given. In section 3 we show the optimal inputs introduced to the FSM part. We give an overall view on the paper along with suggestions on improving the resistance against GD attacks for SNOW 2.0 in section 4. In SNOW2.0, we have two different elements involved in the feedback loop, and a , where is a root of primitive polynomial of degree 4 over .
To be more precise, the LFSR consists of sixteen 32-bit registers and is associated with the feedback polynomial over GF( ) as follows. 
The FSM has two registers, denoted and , each holding 32 bits. The value of the registers at time is denoted and , respectively. The input to the FSM is and the output of the FSM, denoted
Then the output of the keystream generator is given as
The FSM is updated as follows.
The S-box, denoted , is a permutation on based on the round function of Rijndael [7] .
The analysis of optimal inputs introduced to the FSM part
In [2] , the authors claim that the FSM taking two inputs making GD attacks more difficult. Because given the output of FSM, together with and is no longer possible to deduce the next FSM state directly. The update of does not depend on the output of the FSM, but on a word taken from the LFSR. Hence, the introduction of in relation (6) result in improving the resistance against GD attack and correlation attack. But the authors do not show the reason of introducing not other states of LFSR.
In fact, the introduction of in relation (6) is not optimal for improving the resistance against GD attack according to our research. Here, we will replace in relation (6) with other states of LFSR, keeping other parts of SNOW2.0 unchanged. Then we give GD attacks on each kind of modified SNOW2.0. For comparison we also give a GD attack on unmodified SNOW2.0. The results are depicted in Table 1 . In this table, the inputs denote the states of LFSR introduced to the FSM part. 
Conclusions
The designers of SNOW2.0 improved the resistance against Guess and Determine (GD) attack by introducing two inputs to the Finite State Machine (FSM). In this paper, the results show that the introduction of those two inputs is not optimal. The suggestion on improving the resistance against GD attack for SNOW2.0 is given.
